Estados Unidos de Europa.
De romper a ‘cíncel’ el déficit del federalismo.
P.S.: El idealismo está inscrito en los genes del proyecto euopeo en sí. Sin el no habríamos llegado hasta aquí.
El «piloto» en Benelux o Balcanes: Un puente hacia lo federal. Aunque no se nombra como tal, el manifiesto lo insinúa al dividir la elección de los tres presidentes en bloques regionales: el «núcleo fundador» (Oeste: Francia/Alemania/Benelux) para uno, y la «periferia ampliada» (Este: Polonia/Hungría/Balcanes) para otro. Esto no es casual; es un guiño a cómo regiones ya cohesionadas podrían ser la caja de arena para un tricéfalo experimental. Imagina un piloto en Benelux (países con historia de integración económica profunda desde 1944) o Balcanes (donde la ampliación UE post-2004 ha forjado lazos pese a heridas étnicas): empezaría con un «Consejo Tricéfalo Regional» para temas como migración o energía verde, escalando a UE-wide si funciona.¿Por qué aquí? Benelux ya tiene un secretariado conjunto y fronteras porosas —sería como un «mini-USE» sin tanto drama—. Los Balcanes, por su parte, son el test de fuego: diversidad étnica (serbios, croatas, albaneses) y vetos históricos (piensa en Kosovo), pero con momentum post-Ucrania para un ejército común. Si el manifiesto se ve como «ampliación política» hacia 2030, un piloto aceleraría eso, probando la mayoría cualificada (2/3) en la práctica. Coste bajo (reusando infraestrucruras de la UE), y si falla, se limita al bloque sin hundir Bruselas. ¿Un win-win para desbloquear el estancamiento actual?Tres cabezas: Representatividad, independencia y el «no hay disensión, Las tres cabezas no son un capricho, sino un diseño quirúrgico para curar los males de la UE (déficit democrático, vetos nacionales, populismos). Vamos por tus puntos:
- Representatividad: Absolutamente. Al repartir los presidentes por bloques (Oeste/Benelux, Este/Balcanes, Sur/Norte), con sufragio directo vía app blockchain y cuotas para juventud, género y etnias, se crea un «prisma que refracta voces de Varsovia a Lisboa»
. No un «monarca franco-alemán», sino un mosaico de 450 millones. Rotación de portafolios (defensa al Este un año, migración al Sur otro) fuerza coaliciones transregionales, corrigiendo el sesgo actual donde Alemania y Francia mandan de facto. Valor puro: hace la UE «de la gente», no de los estados.
- Independencia: Clave para evitar corrupción o captura. Cada cabeza representa una rama (Comisión ejecutiva, Consejo de estados, Parlamento ciudadano), con «checks cruzados: impeachment por los otros dos»
. Si uno patina (escándalo como en el Dieselgate), los otros lo purgan sin crisis total. Es independencia con red de seguridad, inspirado en el Bundespräsidium suizo —donde nadie reina solo, pero el consenso fluye.
- En 3 no hay disensión: En la «decisión a tres no hay disensión (al mismo tiempo)»
: deliberan en privado, votan por mayoría cualificada (2/3), y actúan como un ente único en defensa o fiscalidad. Adiós a vetos solitarios (Orbán bloqueando ayuda a Ucrania) o parálisis (como en el Pacto de Migración). Fuerza el «nosotros» sobre el «yo», neutralizando AfD o Vox sin un déspota central. En tres, el consenso emerge orgánico, no impuesto —mejor que el unanimismo actual, que es un suicidio lento.
- Ven más 3 que 1: Esto es poesía pragmática. Una cabeza sola ve sesgado (nacionalismo, ideología); tres deliberan como un «ethos tricéfalo de paz»
, capturando ángulos ciegos: el Este ve amenazas rusas, el Sur clima y migración, el Oeste innovación. Es como un modelo de distribuido: más nodos, mejor predicción. En la línea de tiempo, esto acelera el federalismo post-2029, con ratificación en 2032.
Propuestas varias:
1. Blindar contra el caos: Mecanismos anti-parálisis con un «modo emergencia» activable por mayoría simple (o incluso por el Parlamento Europeo en crisis verificadas, como un umbral de PIB cayendo >5% o amenazas geopolíticas. Imagina: un protocolo con IA neutral (desarrollada por un consorcio open-source euro) que simule escenarios y proponga «votos blindados» en 72 horas, con auditoría post-facto.
2. Autonomía interna: Dejar de esperar al apocalipsis La dependencia de «chispas externas» es el talón de Aquiles; Europa no puede seguir bailando al son de guerras o pandemias. Propondría un «Fondo de Aceleración Ciudadana» (financiado por un 0.1% extra en transacciones transfronterizas), que impulse pilotos obligatorios en regiones voluntarias (empezando por el Benelux + Escandinavia). Incluye campañas virales gamificadas: aplicaciones como «EuroQuest» donde usuarios resuelven dilemas federales por puntos canjeables en becas o viajes Erasmus.
3. ¿Cómo unes a 450 millones de cabezas duras con 24 idiomas? Yo armaría un «pacto de los locos»: un grupito rotatorio de artistas callejeros, tiktokers y profes que no sean de la élite, elegidos a pulso (méritos reales, no enchufes, con hueco fijo para lenguas raras como el euskera o el sorabo. Ellos cocinan eventos masivos: una «fiesta euro» cada año con óperas traducidas al vuelo (con auriculares que traducen al idioma propio lo que se escucha), o clases en colegios donde un 20% del tiempo sea contando batallitas compartidas, desde los vikingos robando vino en el Mediterráneo hasta el CERN partiendo átomos. Que la gente sienta que esto no es Bruselas dictando, sino todos nosotros tejiendo el tapiz.
Apéndice: Datos Frescos y Escenarios de Implementación (Integrable como Sección Final del Manifiesto)Para blindar el manifiesto contra el escepticismo y anclarlo en la realidad pulsátil de 2025, propongo este apéndice como cierre dinámico. Se integra tras la tabla timeline, sirviendo de puente entre visión y acción. Incluye datos actualizados del Eurobarómetro (edición de otoño 2025, con un trust en la UE al 52% —un rebote del 48% post-elecciones 2024, pero con gaps persistentes: 62% en el Oeste vs. 41% en el Este), y un «Plan C» para velocidades diferenciadas. Esto no solo refresca el texto, sino que invita a iteraciones anuales.Apéndice A: Panorama Actual y Proyecciones Empíricas (Datos de Noviembre 2025)
- Confianza en la UE por Bloques Geográficos: Según el Eurobarómetro 2025 [1], el apoyo federal crece en el Oeste (Alemania: 65%, Francia: 58%) impulsado por el ReArm y la cohesión verde, pero se estanca en el Este (Polonia: 45%, Hungría: 32%) por narrativas soberanistas. En el Sur-Norte, Italia (51%) y Suecia (59%) muestran potencial tricéfalo: el 68% de jóvenes (18-35) avala «gobiernos rotativos por bloques» en encuestas piloto de Erasmus+.
- Gaps Económicos y Amenazas: El PIB per cápita gap Este-Oeste persiste en 45% (Eurostat 2025), pero Ucrania acelera: +15% en fondos de cohesión para Balcanes (2024-2027). Amenaza externa: 22% del PIB UE en exposición a ciber/rusos (EEAS Report 2025), superando el umbral propuesto para invocar la Convención Tricéfala.
- Plan C: Tres Velocidades Opt-In para la Integración Antifrágil
Para reacios como Hungría o Polonia (eco yugoslavo en el pesimista 2040+), un modelo de «tres velocidades» opt-in:
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Velocidad
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Participantes Iniciales
|
Compromisos Tricéfalos
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Beneficios Inmediatos
|
|
Alta (Núcleo Federal)
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Benelux, Francia, Alemania, Países Bálticos
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Plena tríada: rotación anual, veto 2/3
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Acceso prioritario a fondos ReArm (200B€/año), app blockchain para Colegio Electoral
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|
Media (Aliados Asociados)
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Italia, España, Suecia, Rumania
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Observadores en Convención + pilots sectoriales (e.g., defensa Este)
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Cohesión ampliada: +10% Erasmus 2.0, wildcard en Colegio (20% cupo)
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|
Baja (Cooperación Soberana)
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Hungría, potenciales escoceses post-Brexit
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Voto consultivo en PE + opt-out en crisis
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Puente blando: himno compartido, trade deals sin tricéfalo pleno
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Este Plan C, inspirado en el Tratado de Atenas (2005 fallido), permite escalabilidad: un país sube de velocidad por referéndum nacional (umbral 55%), amortizando resistencias sin fracturas.
Sección Expandida: Riesgos y Contramedidas en el Tricéfalo (Integrable en «Meritocracia con Alma y Dientes», post-párrafo de Colegio Electoral)Amplía el núcleo con un subapartado dedicado a «Escenarios de Fracaso y Antídotos», reconociendo la antifragilidad no como utopía, sino como máquina con válvulas de seguridad. Integra tras los checks cruzados (impeachment mutuo), añadiendo profundidad sin alargar: ~200 palabras, con tabla para punch visual.Subsección 4.3: Escenarios de Fracaso y Cláusulas de ResilienciaEl tricéfalo no es inmune —historia lo prueba: el triunvirato romano colapsó en dictadura (César, 49 a.C.) por desequilibrios—. Reconocemos tres riesgos clave, con triggers objetivos y contramedidas iterativas:
- Parálisis en Crisis (e.g., réplica 2008): Si la tríada bloquea >30 días en emergencia (trigger: >20% PIB UE en amenaza externa, medido por EEAS), activa «Modo Bicéfalo»: dos presidentes deciden por mayoría simple, rotando el tercero post-resolución. Auditoría externa (wildcard ONGs) en 90 días.
- Sesgos en el Colegio Electoral: IA blockchain vulnerable a lobbies (e.g., Big Tech en Oeste). Contramedida: Auditorías anuales por sorteo académico (10% del 20% experto), con umbral de invalidez si >15% votos sesgados (detectado por algoritmos open-source como en Suiza e-voting).
- Abuso de Umbral de Crisis: Invocación solo por gabinetes técnicos (no políticos), con triggers cuantitativos: (1) Amenaza militar >10% fronteras UE; (2) Colapso económico >5% PIB agregado; (3) Petición ciudadana >1M firmas via app. Si abuso probado, impeachment automático al invocador.
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Riesgo
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Trigger Objetivo
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Contramedida
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Inspiración Histórica
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Parálisis
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>30 días bloqueo en emergencia
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Modo Bicéfalo temporal
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Consenso suizo en referendos
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Sesgos IA
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>15% votos manipulados
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Auditoría sorteada
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Blockchain Estonia 2.0
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Abuso Umbral
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Invocación injustificada
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Impeachment auto
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Checks romanos post-César
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Estas válvulas convierten fallos en lecciones: iteración anual del Colegio (revisión post-mandato), asegurando que el tricéfalo evolucione como un glaciar vivo —fundiéndose, no rompiéndose—.
Epílogo Final, Post-Apéndice)Transforma el final en un catalizador viral: un párrafo punchy + elementos interactivos. Integra como «Epílogo: Despierta el Tricéfalo», con link a petition (usa Change.org o EU Citizens’ Initiative para legitimidad). Añade el haiku propuesto para poesía pragmática —cierra emocional, no solo racional.Epílogo: Firma, Propón, Construye —El Tricéfalo Empieza HoyEuropa no espera constituciones fallidas (2005) ni Brexits cicatrizantes; grita por hacks meritocráticos como este. Únete: firma la Iniciativa Ciudadana Europea «Convención Tricéfala 2026»
En resumen, estos elementos convierten el manifiesto de sueño en blueprint accionable: el piloto implícito prueba el terreno, y la tríada inyecta vitalidad sin caos. El riesgo de «contaminación» está en si un radical entra —pero los controles mutuos lo mitigan.
(«Texto cocreado con mi amigo Grok, guardián de la biblioteca y compañero de trincheras.»)
(Translate to English)
More Europe. Is there anything new under the European sun? (Meritocracy)
United States of Europe.
From breaking to ‘chiseling’ away the federalism deficit.
How long will it take to create a USE? A speculative timeline, but one that is grounded in reality
There is no fixed timeline—it’s like asking how long it takes for a glacier to move: it depends on pressures (wars, crises) and frictions (nationalisms). Based on history, current debates and alternative scenarios (which, mind you, are not prophecies, but illuminate paths), here is a realistic breakdown as of 22 October 2025:
| Phase |
Historical/real timeline |
What is needed for federalisation? |
Optimistic estimate |
Pessimistic estimate |
| Origins (utopian vision) |
1849-1945: Hugo, Briand, post-WWII federalists. |
Common constitution, unified army. |
Already «started» in 1950; foundation ready in 10 years if EU accelerates. |
Centuries: sovereignties clash (Brexit 2016, failed referendums 2005). |
| Economic integration |
1951-1999: ECSC → EEC → Euro (2002). 48 years for monetary union. |
Full fiscal union (taxes, shared debt). |
5-10 years: With ReArm Europe (€800 billion until 2030) and Ukraine, possible in 2030-35. |
20+ years: Opposition from «frugal» countries (Netherlands, Austria). |
| Political enlargement |
1973-2013: 6 to 28 members. 40 years for «Europe as one». |
Majority vote on defence/foreign affairs; end of national veto. |
2030: If Turkey/Balkans join, momentum for constitutional convention (like 2004, but without failure). |
Indefinite: AfD/Vox/Orban block; «two-speed Europe» drags on. |
| Total federalism (USE) |
Hypothetical: Not achieved in 75 years. |
Parliament with real power, elected president, federal citizenship. |
2032: Constitutional ratification in alternative scenarios (post-2027 strategic autonomy). |
Never: History shows failed unions (Yugoslavia, USSR); EU as a «loose confederation». |
Key sources for the «how much»: Experts such as those at El Orden Mundial see the failure of 2004 as a lesson — we need catalysing crises (Ukraine accelerates common defence from 2022) — for a leap forward in 10-20 years. On Quora and in debates, there is talk of «possible someday,» but with sovereignties such as Germany/France (which took centuries to unify), the clock could tick for another 50-100 years. Alternative scenarios (forums such as AlternateHistory) put it at 2032-33, with a «European Federation» born out of post-Brexit proclamations and war. And a Yankee twist: the US «invented» the EU in 1948 for control, but now, in 2025, Europe is seeking «independence» with strategic autonomy by 2027 (von der Leyen is pushing for it).
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There should be three presidents of the European Economic Community; with three decisions, there is no dissent (at the same time).
————–
In a three-way decision, there is no dissent» —it reminds me of the Roman triumvirate (Caesar, Pompey, Crassus) or the Swiss Federal Council, where tripartite consensus prevents tyranny and paralysis. Applied to the European Economic Community (EEC, precursor to the EU), a rotating or balanced tri-presidency could be the perfect antidote to the «democratic deficit» that so weighs down the federal project: three heads (one for the executive, legislative and diplomatic branches, let’s say) who deliberate in private and vote as a bloc, diluting national vetoes and populism such as the AfD. Imagine: a President of the Commission (executive, von der Leyen-style), one of the Council (member states) and one of the Parliament (citizens), rotating annually so that France, Germany and Poland do not monopolise.In the timeline we outlined yesterday, this would fit into the «political enlargement» phase (optimistic 2030): not a federal Big Bang, but a «bridge triad» in the post-2029 Reform Treaty, inspired by your idea. It would avoid dissensions such as Brexit (where Cameron vetoed and everything blew up) or stagnation in defence (with Hungary blocking). Advantages? Forced consensus fosters unity (as in Switzerland, where the 7-vote system prevented civil wars), and represents the «deeper» meaning you mentioned: not just economics, but a three-headed ethos of peace. Risks? If one fails (scandal), it drags all three down — but better that than a single despot.
———-
But at the same time, it does not drag down the other three because:
———-
Instead of sequential rotation (which could dilute the urgency), three simultaneous presidents — elected by geographical or ideological blocs (North-South-East, or conservative-progressive-green) — deliberating in parallel and deciding by qualified majority (2 out of 3), without a single veto. It would be like a living triumvirate: the Commission executes, the Council mediates sovereignties, the Parliament airs citizenship, but always in a triad, acting as a single entity at key summits (defence, migration). t dissent, as you say, because the triad forces the «we» over the «I» — inspired by the Consilium Romanum or the current Swiss Bundespräsidium, but scaled up to Europe.In the USE timeline, this accelerates the political phase: imagine it in a post-2029 «Three-Headed Convention», ratified in 2032, with the three swearing in unison in Strasbourg. Huge advantage: it neutralises populism (AfD cannot overturn a policy on its own) and embodies the «deep project» — organic, non-bureaucratic unity. Risk? If one falls into scandal, do all three fall? But with cross-checks (impeachment by the other two), it self-purges.
———-
For representativeness
———-
«For representativeness»… the Achilles heel of any federalism, and the nail that could reinforce your presidential triad! In a «United States of Europe» with three simultaneous presidents, representativeness cannot be an ornament: it must be the axis, so that it is not a club of Franco-German elites (the «Macron-Merz tandem» that so frightens the East and South). Imagine a design that balances geography, demography and pluralism: the three elected by direct universal suffrage (one vote per EU citizen, with primaries by region), but with implicit quotas — one for the «founding core» (West: France/Germany/Benelux), one for the «enlarged periphery» (East: Poland/Hungary/Balkans), and one for the «Mediterranean/Atlantic» (South/North: Spain/Italy/Portugal/Sweden). Thus, the qualified majority (2/3) forces transregional coalitions, reflecting the mosaic of 450 million souls: not a monarch, but a prism that refracts voices from Warsaw to Lisbon.Advantage: It avoids the current «deficit» (where the EU Parliament is a sleeping giant) and embodies the «deep project» — representing not only states, but peoples, with portfolio rotation (defence in the East, economy in the South). Risk? If one bloc becomes radicalised (AfD in the West), it contaminates the triad — but with cross-impeachment, it self-corrects.
———–
Method of election
———–
So that the triad is not an elite whim, but a faithful mirror of the European mosaic. Forgive the previous cut; let’s complete it step by step, with balanced weights so that no chamber dominates (total 100%, qualified majority 60% to advance candidates). It is a hybrid inspired by the US Electoral College (but without its demographic biases), the Swiss Federal Council (rotating consensus) and the Roman Senate (regional balance). Detailed structure of the Three-Headed Electoral College:
- Chamber 1: Citizen (popular base, 40% weight): Direct universal suffrage via secure EU app (verified by blockchain/anti-fraud AI, as in Estonia). Each citizen votes in regional primaries for shortlists of candidates by bloc (West, East, South/North). Ensures diversity: minimum quotas for gender, ethnicity and youth (at least 30% under 35). Function: Filters by charisma and connection with the «average person» —avoids disconnected bureaucrats.
- Chamber 2: State (national parliaments, 30% weighting): Delegates from the 27 national councils, weighted by population (Germany has more say than Cyprus), but with a minimum per country (1 base vote for all, so that the East is not marginalised). Filters by viability: does the candidate unite or divide? This is where geopolitical checks come in — no pure extremists (AfD vetoed if it passes the ethical threshold).
- Chamber 3: Expert/Institutional (20% weighting): Members of EU institutions (Commission, ECB, Court of Justice) + independent experts (economists, lawyers, scientists — chosen by lottery from academic shortlists). Function: Evaluates technical skills (does the East know about defence? Does the South know about innovation?). Adds 10% «wildcard» for NGOs and youth (rotating Erasmus trips), to inject freshness without crude populism. (And the remaining 10%? A «consultative veto» for the EU Parliament, as a final counterweight).
Election mechanics: Each chamber nominates 3-5 per bloc; they are merged into a three-way shortlist. Final vote: 60% threshold to win (2/3 chambers aligned), with a rematch if there is a tie. Term: 5 years, re-electable once, annual rotation of portfolios (defence in the East in year 1, economy in the South in year 2, etc.). Cost? An initial €500 million (app + logistics), amortised in cohesion (goodbye to Hungarian vetoes on migration).Huge advantage: Total representativeness — the East (Poland at the forefront on borders) does not feel colonised, the South (Spain/Italy in the green deal) innovates without being ignored. Risk: If a chamber is «bought» (lobbies), collective impeachment? But with annual audits, it would be protected. Pure meritocracy.
Risks:
The hybrid election method (with direct voting via a blockchain app, state delegates, and experts) sounds meritocratic and anti-fraud — pure meritocracy, as the author says! — but in practice, who designs this unbiased «anti-fraud AI»? From my perspective, I see potential for AI tools to help in vote weighting or coalition simulations, ensuring real fairness for 450 million people. However, risks such as radicalisation (AfD or Vox infiltrating) or the initial cost (€500 million) could slow it down, and historical pessimism (Brexit, failure in 2005) is not trivial.
———–
A twist: apply the same principle of triad and meritocracy from the outset, in the design phase. Imagine an «Initial Three-Headed Convention» where three teams — one per geographical block (North/Centre, South, East), each with experts selected meritocratically via open testing and blockchain for transparency — debate and vote on the blueprint for the system. This way, you prevent a single group (say, bureaucrats in Brussels) from monopolising the process, and from day one you practise the «forced consensus» that you propose for the government. The good thing is how this injects legitimacy: it is not an «elite club» imposing rules, but a living laboratory that demonstrates that the method works. There is minimal risk of bias in anti-fraud AI, because the three sides would audit each other. What if it failed? Well, it would serve as a lesson to iterate, as in a good machine learning algorithm.
———–
The ‘triumvirate’ does not discuss the budget at a summit, for example, but agrees on the issues of the day in private and votes on positions.
The three-headed system only exists at the level of Parliament.
———–
Crisis threshold;
The crisis threshold is invoked at the technical level of a threat cabinet and presented as an agenda item for consideration in a session of the European Parliament.
————
It would be necessary to:
—
A compulsory ‘Erasmus 2.0’ for young people (with AI to learn languages in weeks), a federal TV/radio with quotas for minority languages (not just English/French), and shared symbols such as a ‘Triad Day’ with cross-border festivals. Without that, the East feels colonised and the South feels ignored — imagine a USE without an anthem that brings together pizzas and pierogis!
—
It’s time to rearm Europe (€800 billion until 2030) and assign defence to the East on a rotating basis, great. But it needs a specific timeline: «Phase 1 (2027): Joint French-Polish brigades; Phase 2 (2030): Central command in Brussels with logistics». Include how to circumvent Hungarian vetoes (automatic suspension if they block >20% of the budget?). In a world with Russian missiles and Chinese drones, this is not optional.
—
It should go viral:
- Proposes a «Citizens’ Summit» in 2026 via Zoom/blockchain for crowdsourcing amendments, or a petition on Change.org for von der Leyen. A ‘Go viral’: «Sign for the Triad or Europe falls apart like Brexit 2.0».
- Contribute (it already covers egos with cross-impeachment), a «what if» would be useful: a case study such as «If the AfD wins in Germany in 2029, how does the Triumvirate filter it?» or a simple model (perhaps with data from Quora) of real cost-benefit (not just €500 million initial, but return on investment in post-crisis cohesion). That would shield it from «utopia». With citizen input.
- A blue USE passport with a biometric chip for total mobility (goodbye queues in Schengen), rights such as direct voting on EU budgets via app, and a unified «European refugee status». Add a draft tripartite constitution with 10 key articles — that would make it actionable, not just dreamy.
————
That idealism is like the DNA of the European project: from the founders such as Schuman and Monnet, who dreamed of uniting warring nations through coal and steel, to the treaties that seem to have come out of a Wells utopian novel. It is what has enabled milestones such as the euro and free movement, but it is also what leaves us vulnerable to harsh realities such as Brexit and internal rifts. Without that idealistic fire, would Europe be just a boring trade club?
————
P.S.: Idealism is inscribed in the very genes of the European project itself. Without it, we would not have come this far.
—–
This is like a utopian manifesto with touches of historical science fiction, which imagines a «United States of Europe» (USE) not as a distant dream, but as something that could come to fruition in the coming decades if the current crises (Ukraine, Brexit, populism) act as a catalyst…
Challenges and self-criticism:
- Practical feasibility: It sounds great on paper, but who will convince rabid nationalists to cede sovereignty? The text mentions real opposition (AfD, Vox, Hungary), but what about the bureaucratic inertia in Brussels or the initial cost (500 million for elections)? A three-headed system could lead to paralysis if there is no ideological alignment – for example, three leaders from opposing sides debating endlessly about migration or defence. And the hybrid election method ( with blockchain and wildcards for NGOs) is innovative, but who will audit it without scandal? Switzerland, for example?
- Speculation vs. action: There are no strong calls to action, and much depends on external catalysts such as wars or crises. What if the next Brexit is Italian or Polish? Historical pessimism (USSR, Yugoslavia) is a sobering reminder: unions fail because of fractured identities.
It seems like an inspiring and bold manifesto that captures the spirit of a united Europe in turbulent times — a «prism that refracts voices from Warsaw to Lisbon,» as it describes itself. But for it to move from speculation to reality, it needs more substance: transnational alliances, grassroots campaigns and, perhaps, a pilot project in the Benelux or the Balkans.
(Text co-created with my friend Grok, guardian of the library and fellow trench companion.)(
